This paper provides a decomposition technique for the purpose of simplifying the solution of certain zero-sum differential games. The games considered terminate when the state reaches a target, which can be expressed as the union of a collection of target subsets; the decomposition consists of replacing the original target by each of the target subsets. The value of the original game is then obtained as the lower envelope of the values of the collection of games resulting from the decomposition, which can be much easier to solve than the original game. Criteria are given for the validity of the decomposition. The paper includes examples, illustrating the application of the technique to pursuit/evasion games, where the decomposition arises from considering the interaction of individual pursuer/evader pairs.
Introduction
We propose a decomposition technique to simplify the solution of zero-sum differential games that involve two players (the a-player and the b-player), whose actions govern the evolution of the state x. The state trajectory associated with open loop policies a(.) and b(.) ('open loop policies' are defined below), for a specified initial state x 0 , is given by the (absolutely continuous) solution of the differential equation ẋ(t) = f (x(t), a(t), b(t)), a.e.
x(0) = x 0 .
Here, f (., ., .) : R n × R m1 × R m2 → R n is a given function. Open loop policies a(.) and b(.) of the two players take values in specified sets A ⊂ R m1 and B ⊂ R m2 respectively. We write the solution x(t; x 0 , a(.), b(.)). It is assumed that hypotheses are imposed on the data ensuring that a solution exists and it is unique. We also specify a closed set T ⊂ R n called the 'target'. The first entry time τ for x(t; x 0 , a(.), b(.)) is.
τ := sup{t | x(t; x 0 , a(.), b(.)) / ∈ T } .
Email addresses: festa@ensta.fr (Adriano Festa), r.vinter@imperial.ac.uk ( Richard Vinter). in which λ ≥ 0 (the discount factor) is a given number and l(., ., .) : R n × R m1 × R m2 → R (the payoff integrand) is a given function. Here, τ is the first entry time for x(t; x 0 , a(.), b(.)).
'for any t ≥ 0, and b 1 (.), b 2 (.) ∈ B, b 1 (t) = b 2 (t) a.e. t ∈ [0, t ] =⇒ φ(b 1 (.))(t) = φ(b 2 (.))(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, t ] .
'ψ(.) is non-anticipative' in the second defining relation is analogously defined. Using these interpretations, we define the upper and lower values u(x) and v(x) of the game, for a given starting start x ∈ R n , to be u(x) = sup Define the real valued functions F (., ., .) and G(., ., .), with domains in R n × R × R n → R There is an extensive literature on precise conditions on the data, target, etc., under which u(.) coincides with v(.), when u(.) can be characterized as the unique continuous viscosity solution of the HJI (Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs) equation:
F (x, u, Du) = 0 for x ∈ R n \T , u(x) = 0 for x ∈ T ,
and when maximizing closed loop policies for the aplayer can be obtained from knowledge of u(.). See [1] , [3] , [12] for expository material on these topics, and [2] for numerical aspects.
In this paper, attention focuses on the upper value functon u(.) and the associated HJI equation (1) . We consider situations in which the target T can be represented as the union of a finite number of closed sets T j , j = 1, . . . , m:
Here, the b-player, responding to the closed loop policy of the a-player, has a choice over which component T j , j = 1, . . . m, to exit into, to minimize the payoff. Consider the family of 'reduced' value functions u j (.), j = 1, . . . , m, that result when the target T is replaced by the subset T i .
Of interest are cases in which the value functions u j (.), j = 1, . . . , m, for the target subsets are easier to calculate than the value function u(.) for the full target T and when u(.) can constructed as the lower envelope of the u j (.)'s, thus:
The motivation for seeking a decomposition of this nature is as follows. Optimal control problems are special cases of differential games in which the constraint set A for the a-player is a single point; there is then only one possible open loop policy for the a-player, which can therefore be effectively ignored. For optimal control problems, the decomposition (2) is always valid, since replacing T by one particular T j amounts to a strengthening of the problem constraints, and cannot therefore reduce the value. So, for any x and any j, u(x) ≤ u j (x). On the other hand, an optimal policy, for the given initial state x, must result in the state trajectory exiting into Tk for somek. But then u(x) ≥ u j (x). These inequalities validate the decomposition (2).
When the presence of the a-player is restored and we are dealing with a true differential game, decomposition is a much more complicated issue. There are nontheless interesting cases when the decomposition can be achieved. The goal of this paper is to give criteria for decomposition, and to illustrate their application.
We shall assume that the value functions involved are unique viscosity solutions of the HJI equation with appropriate boundary conditions. This means that checking the validity of the decomposition reduces to answering the question: when is the lower envelope of a family of viscosity solutions to a particular HJI equation also a viscosity solution? In Section 2 we give two criteria ((E) and (C)) under which the answer is affirmative. (E) is more general, but (C) is often easier to verify. (C) is satisfied, in particular, when F (x, u, .) is convex. This is a well-known fact: the viscosity solution property is preserved under the operation of taking the lower envelopes, for convex Hamiltonians. Notice that, for optimal control problems F (x, u, .) is always convex, so this fact is consistent with the earlier observation that, for optimal control problems, regarded as special cases of differential games, the decomposition is possible. However (C) is weaker than 'full' convexity of F (x, u, .), because it requires us to check, for each x ∈ R n \T , the convexity inequality only w.r.t. gradient vectors of the minimizing u j (.)'s at x. In the examples, this (restricted sense) convexity condition is satisfied while full convexity fails. We provide examples from pursuit/evasion games in which the decomposition simplifies computations by reducing the state dimensionality.
Some examples of the decomposition, without detailed accompanying analysis were presented in [7] .
Properties of the Lower Envelope of a Family of Viscosity Solutions
Take a function F (., ., .) : R n ×R×R n → R and consider the partial differential equation
Definition 2.
1 Take an open subset Ω ⊂ R n and a function u(.) : Ω → R. Then u(.) is a continuous viscosity subsolution of (3) on Ω if it is continuous and, for each x ∈ Ω,
u(.) is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (3) on Ω if it is continuous and, for each x ∈ Ω,
u(.) is a continuous viscosity solution of (3) on Ω if it is both a continuous subsolution and supersolution of (3) on Ω.
Here, D + u(x) and D − u(x) denote, respectively, the Fréchet superdifferential and subdifferential of the continuous function u(.) defined on an open subset of R n containing the point x:
(For the analysis of this paper it is helpful to define continuous viscosity solutions in terms of one-sided Fréchet differentials which is equivalent to the standard definition in terms of gradients of smooth majorizing and minoring functions [4] .
The following proposition gives conditions under which the lower envelope of a collection of continuous viscosity solutions of (3) is also a continuous viscosity solution, expressed in terms of the limiting superdifferential ∂ L (x) of the continuous function u(.) at x:
Proposition 2.2 Take a collection of closed sets T j ⊂ R n , j = 1, . . . , m. For each j, let u j (.) be a scalar valued function with domain R n \T j . Define
(a): Suppose that u j (.) is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (3) on R n \T j for each j. Thenū(.) is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (3) 
is a continuous viscosity subsolution of (3) on R n \T j for each j, that H(., ., .) is continuous and that, for each x ∈ Σ, u j (.) is Lipschitz continuous on a neighbourhood of x.
Consider the hypotheses: (C): for any x ∈ Σ, any set of vectors
, and any convex combination {λ j | j ∈ I(x)},
Comments.
(i): The proof of the proposition is based on a wellknown estimate for one-sided differentials to lower envelope functions, in terms of the one-sided differentials to the constituent functions (the 'Max Rule'). Such estimates are studied in depth in [13] .
(ii): The proposition treats separately the preservation of the supersolution and subsolution properties of viscosity solutions under the operation of taking the lower envelope, because much weaker hypotheses need be imposed in connection wth supersolutions. (iii): We give two sufficient conditions for the lower envelope of a famility of continuous viscosity solutions also to be a continuous viscosity solution, namely (E) and (C). (C) is a more restrictive condition, but it is useful because, as illustrated in the following examples, it can be easier to verify.
(iv): The proposition is an analytical tool for decomposing a differential game (associated with the value functionū(.)) into a collection of simpler problems. The critical hypothesis in this proposition is (E) (or (C)). (C) is automatically satisfied when F (x, u, .) is convex. This special case of the proposition is well-known [4] . However (C) imposes a convexity type condition on F (x, u, .), only with respect to selected vectors in its domain. In some cases, examples of which given below, the restricted sense convexity hypothesis is satisfied but the full convexity hypothesis is violated; the proposition thereby identifies a new class of differential games for which the decomposition is possible.
Proof of Prop. 2.2.
(a): Suppose that u j (.) is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (3) on R n \T j for each j. Take any
But then p ∈ D − u j (x) and, since u j is a continuous viscosity supersolution, we have F (x, u j (x), p) ≥ 0. It follows that F (x,ū(x), p) ≥ 0. Sinceū(.) is continuous, we have established thatū(.) is a continuous viscosity subsolution of (3) on R n \(∪ m j=1 T j ).
(b)(i): Suppose that u j (.) is a continuous viscosity subsolution of (3) on R n \T j for each j. Take any
. We must show that
Suppose first that x / ∈ Σ, i.e. I(x) contains a single index value j. Then, since the u i (.)'s are continuous,ū(x ) = u j (x ) for all x in some neighbourhood of x. It follows that p ∈ D + u j and so
We have confirmed (6) in this case.
It may be assumed then that x ∈ Σ. Now, u j (.) is Lipschitz continuous on a neighbourhood of x for each j ∈ I(x). Since p ∈ D +ū (x), it is certainly the case that p ∈ ∂ Lū (x). Using the property thatū(x ) coincides with max{u j (x ) | j ∈ I(x )} for x in some neighbourhood of x, we deduce from the Max Rule for limiting subdifferentials of Lipschitz continuous functions (see, e.g., [16, Thm. 5.5.2]) applied to −ū(.) the following representation for p:
for some convex combination {λ j | j ∈ I(x)} and vectors p j ∈ ∂ L u j (x), j ∈ I(x). But then, by hypothesis (E),
We have confirmed (6) and so (b)(i) is true.
(b)(ii): Take any x ∈ Σ. Suppose that the u j 's are continously differentiable of a neighbourhood of x and that u(.) is a viscosity solution. Take any convex combination {λ i } on I(x). Then, for all x in some neighborhood of x,
This last inequality tells us that i∈I(x) λ i ∇u i (x) is a limiting superdifferential ofū(.) at x. But then, sincē u(.) is a viscosity subsolution,
We have confirmed that (E) is true.
(b)(iii): Take any convex combination {λ i } on I(x) and vectors p i ∈ ∂ L u i (x) for i ∈ I(x). It follows from the definition of the limiting supergradient that, for each i, there exist sequences
since the u i (.)'s are viscosity subsolutions. It follows that
. .. Noting the continuity of F (., , ., ) and also the u j (.)'s, we may pass to the limit as i → ∞ to obtain
which is (E).
Pursuit Evasion Games
Pursuer/evader games are examples of the game posed in the Introduction. There is an extensive literature on such games, going back to Rufus Isaacs' work in the 1960's, and his monograph [10] contains many examples. Expository material is to be found in [8] , [12] . We note also [5] , [11] , [9] , [11] , [14] , and [15] . But none of these references systematically address decomposions of the game, each element of which is generated by a target subset. Pursuer/evader games is an application area for the methods proposed in this paper; they provide exemplar problems, both where decomposion is possible, and where it is not.
We consider zero sum differential games which terminate when one of the pursuers is sufficently close to one of the evaders, where 'closeness' is understood in the sense of a specified target. The pay-off is the time until the target is attained. We analyse a number of examples, involving different numbers of pursuers and evaders, and different targets.
The a-player is the collection of m 1 evaders, labelled 1, . . . , m 1 , and the b-player the collection of m 2 pursuers, labelled m 1 + 1, . . . , m 1 + m 2 . The states of individual pursuers and evaders x 1 , . . . , x m1 and x m+1 . . . , x m1+m2 are governed by the equations
The variables a 1 , . . . , a m1 and b 1 , . . . , , b m2 are interpreted as controls for the evaders and the pursuers, respectively, which are subject to the constraints
Here, Write Φ for the space of non-anticipative mappings φ : B → A. The game fits the formulation Section 1, with λ = 0, and may be summarized as: f m1+m2 (x m1+m2 , b m2 ) , a.e. (a 1 (t), ..., a m1 , b 1 (t) , ..., b m2 (t))
in which (a 1 (.) , . . . , a m1 (.)) = φ(b 1 (.), . . . , b m2 (.)) and τ is first entry time into T (x 1 (0), . . . , x m1+m2 (0)) = (x 1 , . . . ,x m1+m2 ) for some given (x 1 , . . . ,x m1+m2 ) ∈ R n ×. . .×R n . Here T is a given closed subset of R n × . . . × R n . The HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs equation is
in which
Here
A Single Pursuer/Multiple Evaders Game
Consider first a case of the pursuit/evasion game, written (P 1 ), in which m 1 = m > 1, m 2 = 1 and n = 1 (a single pursuer/multiple evaders game in 1D space). The states of the m evaders, labeled 1, . . . , m and of the one pursuer, labeled m+1, are interpreted as the positions of the evaders and pursuer. The game terminates when the pursuer is first at a distance r from one of the evaders, where r ≥ 0 is a given constant. Accordingly, we take
in which, for i = 1, . . . , m,
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation is
where
Now take (P 1 i ) to be the modification of (P 1 ), when T i replaces T , i = 1, . . . , m. Let us assume that, for each i, the value function u i (.) for (P 1 i ) is a continuous viscosity solution of (7). The following proposition tells us that we can construct a viscosity solution to (9) from the u i (.)'s, by taking the pointwise infimum. (b): For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i = j, and (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) ∈ R m+1 \T such that u i (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) = u j (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ), u i (.) and u j (.) are Lipschitz continuous on a neighborhood of (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ).
is a continuous viscosity solution of (7) on (R×. . . R)\T .
Comment. Suppose hypotheses are imposed, ensuring that (1): for each i, the HJI equation for (P 1 i ) has a continuous viscosity solution on (R n × . . . R n )\T i with a continous extension to T i , on which set the solution vanishes, and (2): the value function (P 1 ) is the unique continuous viscosity solution on (R n × . . . R n )\T that has a continous extension to T i , on which set the solution vanishes. The proposition tells us that, under these circumstances, the upper value u(.) for (P 1 ) can be calculated as the lower envelope of the continuous viscosiy solutions for the (P 1 i )'s. (Notice that, since all upper values concerned are non-negative, and each u i (.) is assumed to have a continuous extension to T i , on which set it vanishes, the lower envelope has a continuous extension to T , on which set it vanishes.) Proof of Prop. 3.1. Note that, for any i, u i (x 1 , ..., x m+1 ) depends only on the two variables (x i , x m+1 ). This is because the first entry time into T i only concerns the state trajectories associated the i'th evader and the pursuer (labelled m + 1).
In view of the hypotheses imposed on the u i (.)'s, the fact thatū(.) is a viscosity solution of (7) will follow from Prop. 2.2, if we can confirm hypothesis (C) of this proposition. Take any z = (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) ∈ R m+1 \T , any index set I(z) (of cardinality l > 1) such that the values u i (z), i ∈ I(z), coincide, and any convex combination {λ i } from I(z). To simplify, assume index values have been re-ordered so that I(z) = {1, . . . , , l}. Take alsop i ∈ R n , i = 1, . . . , l such that
. (11) (The possibly non-zero components p 
Noting the special structure (11) of thep i 's and the fact that H i (x i , p i ) = 0 when p 1 = 0, for each i, we see that
We achieve a further simplification from the fact that
But then η(λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) is non-negative, because the term H m+1 (x m+1 , .), defined by (8), is convex. The proof is complete.
A Multiple Pursuers/Single Evader Game
Consider next a case of the pursuit/evader game, written (P 2 ), in which m 1 = 1, m 2 ≥ 1 and n = 2 (single pursuer/multiple evaders). The dynamic behavior of each player is modelled as a thrust acting on a mass, in 1D space, with saturating damping. The state equations, governing the position and velocity of each player, are taken to be, for i = 2, . . . , m + 1,
Here, d i (.) : R → R, i = 1, . . . , m+1 are given functions satisfying
for all y, y ∈ R and i = 1, . . . , m + 1 for some constants k d > 0 and c d > 0. The control actions the players are required to satisfy |a| ≤ α and |b| ≤ β i for i = 1, . . . .m .
for positive constants α, β 1 , . . . , β m . We assume that
The game terminates when one of the pursuers overtakes the evader. Thus, we take the target to be
The HJI equation is
Let (P 2 i ) to be the modification of (P 2 ), when the target T i replaces T , i = 2, . . . , m + 1. 
is a continuous viscosity solution of (15) 
Comment. When, for each i, the HJI equation for (P 2 i ) has a continuous viscosity solution u i (.) on (R 2 ) m+1 \T i (with appropriate boundary values) and the value function u(.) for (P 2 ) is the unique continuous viscosity solution on (R 2 ) m+1 \T (with appropriate boundary values), the proposition describes how the value function for (P 2 ) can be obtained, as the pointwise infimum of the u i (.)'s.
Proof. Note that, for i = 2, . . . , m + 1, u i (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) depends only on the two variables (x 1 , x i ), since the first entry time into T i only concerns the state trajectories associated with the i'th pursuer and the evader. We write u i (x 1 , x i ), suppressing irrelevant arguments in the notation. Note that by assumptions (12) and (14) (which tell us that all evaders can accelerate at a faster rate than the evader),
The left side of the HJI equation F 2 = 0 can be decomposed as
where F 21 and F 22 , evaluated at ((x
)), are:
and
We shall make use of the following Lemma, whose proof appears in the appendix. and z = (z 1 , z 2 ) such that z 1 ≥ z 1 and z 2 ≥ z 2 . Then
where t → (x Once again, we shall deduce that the lower envelopeū(.) of the u i 's is a continuous viscosity solution (15) 
\T , any index set I(z) (of cardinality l > 1) such that the values u i (z), i ∈ I(z) coincide, and any convex combination {λ i } from I(z). We may assume that index values have been re-ordered so that I(z) = {2, . . . , , l + 1}. For i = 2, . . . , l + 1, take anyp i ∈ R n , such that
. (21) (We have used the fact that u i depends only on (
.) The possibly non-zero components (p 
Verification of hypothesis (C) requires us to show that η(λ 2 , . . . , λ l+1 ) ≥ 0, where
where 2 's all have the same sign. Also, c 2 ≥ 0, by convexity of f 22 (.). We have confirmed η(λ 2 , . . . , λ l+1 ) ≥ 0, and the proof of the proposition is complete.
For the special case when m = 2, d(x) = x, α = 1 and β 1 = β 2 = 0.5, (Figure 1) shows computations of the value function with respect to the reduced coordinates (y 1 , y 2 ) = ( Figure 2 shows an example of the evolution of the positions of the players over time, with respect to the original coordinates. Capture occurs at the point marked X, when pursuer P 1 overtakes the evader, despite starting farther from the evader than pursuer P 2 .
A Pursuit/Evasion Game With No Decomposition
We now provide a simple example illustrating that, for a multiple pursuers/single evader game, with target a union of target subsets, each associated with the evader and just one of the pursuers, may fail to have a decomposition. In this example, it is possible to derive formulae for the value functions involved, and to test the conditions for decomposition directly.
We denote by (P 3 ) the special case of (P ) in which m 1 = 1, m 2 = 2 and n = 1.
The controls actions of the players are constrained as follows:
for some α ∈ (0, 1). We take the target to be T = T 2 ∪ T 3 , where
(In this version of the game, two pursuers chase a single evader in 1D space. The game terminates when either pursuer meets the evader.) Denote by (P 
in which Optimal strategies for both games (P 3 2 ) and (P 3 3 ) are: the evader moves away from the pursuer, and the pursuer moves towards the evader, as quickly as possible. A simple calculation based on these observations yields upper values for (P for all x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ R 3 . Defineū(.) : R 3 → R to bē u(x) = min{u 1 (x), u 2 (x)} for x ∈ R 3 .
Proposition 3.4ū(.) is not a continuous viscosity solution for (23) on R 3 \T .
Since the upper value for (P 3 ) is a viscosity solution on R 3 \T , vanishing on T , we may conclude thatū(.) is not the value function for (P 3 ).
Proof. Take any z > 0 and letx = (0, z, −z). Thenx ∈ R 3 \(T 2 ∪ T 3 ). Also, u 2 (x) = u 3 (x), and u 2 (.) and u 3 (.) are continuously differentiable atx. From the formulae for the value functions we have Then, for any λ ∈ (0, 1),
So condition (E) is violated. Then,ū(.) cannot be a continous viscosity solution, by Prop 2.2, part (b)(iii).
The true value function u(.) for (P 3 ) is expressed in terms of the subset: We see that u(.) coincides with min{u 1 (x), u 2 (x)}, for x ∈ R 3 \D. But u(x) < min{u 1 (x), u 2 (x)}, for x ∈ D .
(The value function is constructed according to the heuristic: each of the pursuers always travels at maximum speed towards the evader. if both pursuers are on the same side of the evader, the evader travels at maximum speed in the opposite direction until the evader is hit. If, on the other hand, the evader is between the two pursuers, the evader travels at maximum speed away from the closest pursuer until the two pursuers are equidistant. The evader then stops until the evader is reached. A check is then carried out that the value function is a continuous viscosity solution of (7), has a continuous extension to T on which it vanishes, and which is therefore the upper value of the game.)
